Exercise 10 rubric
Total: 20 points. Assess the stated publisher-verification objective. No cryptographic implementation, replay protection, or production update system is required for full credit.
| Criterion | Points | Full-credit evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Reproduce the flaw | 4 | Genuine update accepted (1); changed message with old checksum rejected (1); recomputed checksum matches while signature is invalid and starter accepts the change (2) |
| Explain trust and exact bytes | 4 | Distinguishes checksum from publisher signature (1); distinguishes public verification key from private signing key (1); explains why the app's pinned key, not an envelope-provided key, determines trust (1); explains exact payload bytes (1) |
| Repair the policy | 4 | Only the acceptance policy changes to use the supplied trusted-publisher verification helper; helpers, keys, fixtures, and checks remain unchanged |
| Verify behavior | 6 | Genuine update accepted after restart (1); rehashed tampering rejected with the prior announcement preserved (2); second genuine update accepted (1); actual checks output reaches 12/12 (2) |
| Explain limits and communicate evidence | 2 | Explains that genuine replay is permitted, signatures do not establish freshness, and identifies one concern outside scope (1); submits clear own-run evidence and identifies the website activity as a recorded simulation when used (1) |
A matching checksum alone earns no signature-verification credit. A rejected update followed by a reset does not establish preserved state. An always-deny policy earns no repair credit because it blocks genuine updates. A policy that trusts an update's own public key fails the publisher boundary.
Award partial credit for demonstrated intermediate results and correct reasoning. Report unexecuted checks as unverified. Optional extensions should not be required for the 20 points.